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Dr. Eva-Lotta Hedman Southeast Asia International Affairs Programme, LSE IDEAS
Beyond Machine Politics? 
Reformism, Populism and Philippine 
Elections
The general elections in the Philippines are fast approaching. On May 10, more than 85,000 candidates will contest some 17,000 elected offices, including the Presidency, half the Senate, 
the entire House, and all elected local positions (governor, vice governor, board members, mayor, vice 
mayor, councillors). Much attention is focused on the presidential candidates and their campaigns, 
featuring political speeches, star-studded rallies, and, invariably, candidates breaking into song and 
dance. With an expected three million first-time voters and projections of a ‘youth swing vote’ from the 
40 percent of registered voters aged 18-35, the election period has also seen more concerted efforts 
to mount ‘virtual campaigns’ using web-based tools, in particular presidential front-runners Senator 
Benigno ‘Noynoy’ Aquino (Liberal Party) and Senator Manny Villar (Nacionalista Party).
 
I. Democracy in the Philippines
Democracy in the Philippines has been described variously in terms of “factionalism” and “clientelism”, 
“caciquism” and “bossism” but the overall pattern has been clear. Elected politicians have been 
drawn from the landowning, commercial and industrial oligarchy of the archipelago, representing its 
interests both directly and through delegation. Competition for political office has revolved around 
contestation for the spoils of state power between rival families and factions within this ruling class. 
Poverty and economic insecurity have combined with a highly decentralised political structure to render 
the majority of Filipinos susceptible to clientelist, coercive, and monetary inducements and pressures 
during elections. Meanwhile, the prominent role of money in Philippine elections – for buying votes, 
bribing officials, and otherwise oiling the machinery – has created a structural imperative of fund-raising 
that guarantees politicians’ continuing use of state powers and resources for personal and particularistic 
benefit and their abiding reliance on landowners, merchants, bankers, and industrialists. Small 
wonder that observers have been most impressed by the continuities in this seemingly seamless 
system of oligarchical democracy in the Philippines, as seen in the close attention paid to “political 
dynasties” that have dominated municipalities, congressional districts, and in some cases entire 
provinces across several generations and many decades.
II. Back to the Future: New Forms of Voter Mobilisation
Of course, it is also possible to discern efforts aimed at challenging or circumventing such political 
dynamics through alternative forms of voter mobilisation. During what I have termed ‘critical elections,’ 
the mobilisation of – voluntarist, non-partisan, patriotic – national citizens campaigns for ‘free and fair 
elections’ have helped energise the opposition’s bid for the presidency against a continuista incumbent. 
Such campaigns accompanied the 1953, 1969, and 1986 elections, and, as I have shown elsewhere, 
enjoy a close affinity with the demonstrations of ‘People Power’ that helped unseat a president in 
1986 and, again, in 2001.
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Since the restoration of formal democratic institutions 
and practice in 1986, moreover, contests for the 
highest elected office of the land have also seen 
– failed and successful – alternative forms of voter 
mobilisation in the Philippines. On the one hand, 
in the first presidential election since the fall of 
Marcos, anti-graft and corruption crusader Miriam 
Defensor Santiago launched an electoral campaign 
in 1992 characterised by unprecedented reformist 
zeal and appeal, especially to younger generations of 
voters who have come of age in the post-authoritarian 
period. Whether or not her failed presidential 
bid fell foul of large-scale electoral fraud, as widely 
charged at the time, including in an election 
protest filed with the Supreme Court, the outcome 
signalled that “democratic consolidation” had been 
achieved, albeit in such ways as to confirm the staying 
power of Philippine oligarchic democracy and the 
vigour of its electoral machinery, at the expense of 
greater democratisation.
On the other hand, in the second presidential elections 
in the wake of authoritarian rule, the populist appeal 
of opposition candidate and (former) movie star 
Joseph ‘Erap’ Estrada succeeded in captivating a 
nation and capturing the presidency in 1998. Having 
won election first to the vice-presidency in 1992 and 
then the presidency with the largest vote margins in 
Philippine history, Estrada found himself the target 
of mounting public criticism and the first presidential 
impeachment hearing to reach the Philippine Senate, 
prior to his unceremonious unseating  by ‘People 
Power’ in January 2001.
Fast-forwarding to 2004, the third presidential 
elections to be held in the post-authoritarian period, 
what stands out is the failure of Philippine cinema’s 
all-time great Fernando Poe, Jr., popularly known as 
‘FPJ’, to translate his long-standing and nation-wide 
iconic star into electoral victory. As in 1992, the 
successful capture of the presidency by the ruling 
party candidate was accompanied by allegations of 
wholesale electoral fraud. Once again, the opposition 
filed an election protest with the Supreme Court, 
but in addition, this time the allegations of electoral 
fraud gained much wider traction and directly 
implicated the re-electionist presidential incumbent 
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo who, as Estrada’s former 
vice-president, had assumed the top job in 2001. As 
in 1992, however, the Supreme Court dropped the 
case and the ruling party’s candidate was declared 
the duly elected president of the Philippines.
In the post-Marcos period, it is thus possible to discern 
at least two distinct forms of voter mobilisation that, 
in different ways and to varying degrees of success, 
have sought to circumvent the role and significance 
of clientelism, coercion and capital in Philippine 
politics and society. As indicated by the brief review 
above, in two out of three presidential contests 
during this period, the 1992 and 2004 electoral 
campaigns to elect Miriam Defensor Santiago and 
Ferdinand Poe Jr. respectively, suggest themselves 
as significant instances of such alternative forms 
of voter mobilisation. At the same time, they failed 
to translate widespread support – for ‘Miriam’ in 
1992 and for ‘FPJ’ in 2004 – into final victory at the 
polls. By contrast, while the winning presidential 
bid of ‘Erap’ succeeded in mobilising voters in ways 
irreducible to machine or money politics in 1998, 
neither his unprecedented vote margin, nor his 
enduring popularity, could prevent the extra-electoral 
ouster from power that followed in mid-term. As 
a result, (former) vice-president Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo assumed the presidency without having won 
election in 2001.
III. Something New: ‘Philippine 
Democracy, Inc.’
Despite the considerable staying power of an 
entrenched system of voter mobilisation through 
clientelism, coercion, and capital in the Philippines, it 
is thus also possible to see the addition of ‘something 
new’ to such pervasive patterns. First of all, it is 
worth recalling that in the Philippines, as elsewhere, 
the structural decline of patron-clientelism has been 
linked to demographic change. Since the late 1960s, 
the expansion of a segment of urban poor and, 
in absolute terms, a growing urban middle class, 
has anticipated an overall decline in what has been 
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referred to elsewhere as the ‘integrative capacity’ of political machines. The resurrection of formal democratic 
institutions in the post-Marcos period saw the resumption of economic growth and the rapid growth of 
many urban and peri-urban landscapes across the Philippines, which, once again, raised the spectre of 
new social imaginaries.
Second, shifts in the political party and voting system in the Philippines have followed changes to the 
electoral rules in the post-Marcos period. The new electoral rules introduced with the resurrection of 
formal democratic institutions spelled the end of the two-party system and the associated zero-sum logic 
of Philippine elections. As the new rules removed representatives of the incumbent administration and the 
dominant opposition parties from boards of election inspectors and canvassers, they also anticipated the 
shift to multi-party electoral competition that has characterised Philippine politics and society in the post-
authoritarian period. This shift, in turn, has opened up new possibilities for a more variegated and ‘flexible’ 
array of political parties and coalitions to field candidates in the contestation for an unprecedented number 
of elected seats at municipal, provincial, and national level.
Third, in class terms, the configuration of elected representatives has changed in tandem with the expansion 
and differentiation of the Philippine economy. That is, the diversification of business interest across economic 
sectors and administrative districts has anticipated patterns of brokerage by which the owners of the largest 
conglomerates in the Philippines lend support to top corporate lawyers, veteran machine politicians, and 
celebrities. This development has been evident in both the Philippine House and Senate and has seen major 
magnates bankroll clusters of candidates in elections, as well as lobbying campaigns on specific pieces of 
legislation during their terms. This pattern of brokerage indicates a shift in the relationship between the 
spheres of business and politics, allowing for a new cast of candidates to ‘take the money and run.’
As suggested by the succession of presidential contests in the post-authoritarian period, however, there 
are at least two key constraining conditions working against the realisation of the kind of transformative 
potential suggested by the enabling shifts identified above. On the one hand, electoral fraud and undue 
advantages enjoyed by the incumbent administration have served to delimit the scope for ‘something 
new’ to register in the canvassing of votes during elections (1992, 2004). In this regard, the changes in 
electoral rules and the pattern of brokerage described above have also encouraged electoral fraud of a 
so-called ‘wholesale’ kind in the canvassing of votes. Little surprise then, that the (comparatively untested) 
introduction of an automated vote count in the 2010 elections is a cause for concern. According to a 
recent national survey, almost half of respondents (47%) agreed that “[t]he machines that will be used to 
count the votes in the 2010 election can easily be sabotaged in order to fake the election results” (Social 
Weather Station October 24-27, 2009). 
On the other hand, the mid-term ouster of a sitting president who had won election against the (former) 
incumbent administration candidate was not merely unprecedented, but arguably, also a new, unconstitutional 
precedent against the future inroads of ‘something new’ in Philippine politics and society. As opposition 
politicians, corporate executives, and Catholic clergy returned to the parliament of the streets with calls for 
‘civil society’ to support the ‘moral crusade’ against Estrada, ‘People Power’ spelled the unceremonious end 
to a Philippine presidency in mid-term. Having first changed the course of history in 1986, by helping to 
prevent Marcos from sanitising his long-term authoritarian rule through a national ballot, ‘People Power’ 
has since gained added circulation as political discourse, no longer merely part of the repertoire of protest 
against the conduct and outcome of elections, but also against an incumbent president. Whether ‘the end 
justified the means,’ as argued by some in the aftermath of Estrada’s ouster, this turn of events presented 
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a departure from the constitutionally prescribed procedures for presidential succession. As such, it has also 
left a complex legacy for the consolidation of democratic practice in the Philippines.
The post-Marcos period therefore suggests a rather mixed picture in terms of new forms of voter mobilisation 
and, not least, the effects thereof for shrinking what has been referred to as the ‘democratic deficit’ in 
the Philippines. As indicated by the 2010 election campaign, the phenomenon of ‘political branding’ is an 
important aspect of the trends in shifting voter mobilisation in the country. Assisted by professionalised 
campaign managers, media consultants, and national opinion surveys, a political brand is developed to 
help advertise a candidate and his/her platform in the market of votes. In the 2010 general elections, for 
example, there are evident efforts at such branding of the two front runners, Manny Villar and Noynoy 
Aquino, as young outsiders ready to take on oligarchical rule, party cartels, political corruption and electoral 
fraud. Of course, neither Villar, nor Aquino is new to Philippine politics, or without the political machinery 
of the country’s two oldest parties. Nonetheless, their campaigns underline the extent to which political 
branding has made inroads in Philippine elections, supplementing more familiar modes of voter mobilisation 
in the country.
In conclusion, as discussed above, underlying changes in the human geography of voters, the regulatory 
framework of elections, and the economic diversification of oligarchs have contributed to opening up 
possibilities for new forms of voter mobilisation. At the same time, such possibilities and the promise they 
hold for further democratisation in the Philippines continue to struggle against not merely the old, familiar 
politics of clientelism, coercion and capital, but also the more recent permutations of certain kinds of wholesale 
electoral fraud. While typically associated with progress and change, and, indeed, with ‘new citizens-cum-
voters’, ‘People Power,’ as a perhaps all too familiar repertoire of protest, may also have emerged as part 
of the challenges to institutionalising democratic consolidation in the Philippines. ■
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